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In re: Matter of E.R. C/W 73198, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 29 (May 3, 2018)1 
 
FAMILY LAW: FAMILIAL PLACEMENT PREFERENCE 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court held that once parental rights have been terminated, NRS 128.110(2) is the 
appropriate standard for applying the familial placement preference—not NRS 432B.550(5).  
 
Background  
 
 In July 2015, Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) removed one-month-old 
E.R. (the child) from the custody of her mother, Nellie S., because of neglect. The district court 
adopted a goal of reunification between Nellie and the child. DFS conducted a search for relatives 
with whom to place the child but was unsuccessful. By August 2016, Nellie had not maintained 
visitation with the child or contact with DFS. In response, the district court changed the 
permanency goal to termination of parental rights and adoption. DFS initiated a proceeding to 
terminate Nellie’s parental rights, and in September 2016, the child was placed with Philip R. and 
Regina R. (the foster parents). 
 In October 2016, Nellie’s first cousin, Stephanie R., contacted DFS and requested 
placement of the child with her and her husband in Georgia (the maternal relatives). DFS initiated 
the process for obtaining out-of-state placement approval for the maternal relatives, which was 
approved in March 2017. 
 Before the out-of-state placement was approved, however, the district court entered an 
order terminating Nellie’s parental rights on February 18, 2017. The termination order vested the 
custody and control of the child in DFS with the authority to place the child for adoption. 
Subsequently, the foster parents initiated the process for adopting the child.  
 In April 2017, DFS allowed the maternal relatives to address the district court regarding 
placement of the child, and an evidentiary hearing was held before a court master. DFS testified 
about its search for relatives, explaining that DFS was unaware of the maternal relatives until they 
contacted DFS in October 2016. DFS also testified that the then-two-year-old child had become 
extremely bonded with the foster parents, and it was not in the child’s best interest to be placed 
with the maternal relatives because it would delay permanency. Taryn Lamaison, a DFS supervisor 
and a national child trauma trainer, agreed that removing the child from foster care was not in the 
child’s best interest. Lamaison explained that another move would likely cause long-term trauma, 
but a gradual transition to the new home accompanied by therapy could lessen the trauma.  
 The foster parents testified about the home, family, care, and educational development they 
provided the child since September 2016 and that they were committed to an open adoption. 
Stephanie testified that although she knew Nellie had given birth, she was unaware that the child 
was in protective custody until October 2016. Stephanie described the home and care she and Joey 
could provide the child and was willing to transition the child gradually to minimize trauma.  
 The hearing master found that (1) DFS should have located Stephanie sooner because DFS 
contacted another relative Stephanie knew, (2) the maternal relatives demonstrated a reasonable 
excuse for the delay in requesting placement, and (3) both couples would provide a good family 
and home for the child. The master concluded that although the child was incredibly bonded with 
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the foster parents, the “family connection is the overriding consideration,” and the child was likely 
to end up with one of her siblings if placed with the maternal relatives.2 Accordingly, the master 
recommended that the child be placed with the maternal relatives if they comply with the trauma 
minimization transition as outlined by DFS. The foster parents and DFS filed objections to the 
hearing master’s recommendation.  
 After hearing arguments on the objections, the district court found that the hearing master’s 
findings were not clearly erroneous and affirmed the recommendation. The district court agreed 
that the maternal relatives had a reasonable excuse for the delay in seeking placement of the child, 
and thus, the familial placement preference under NRS 432B.550 applied. The court also found 
that the hearing master considered the child’s best interests in making his decision and that the 
maternal relatives will likely end up with one of the child’s siblings. The foster parents and DFS 
both filed petitions for a writ of mandamus with the Court, who consolidated the two cases. 
 
Discussion 
 
 NRS 432B.550(5) governs placement of a child, which creates a presumption that placing 
the child with siblings is in the child’s best interest and requires that family relatives be given 
preference over foster parents.3 The foster parents and DFS argued that the familial placement 
preference no longer applied once the parental rights were terminated. The maternal relatives 
argued that the familial preference remains intact after termination of parental rights.  
 The Court concluded that although the placement decision was initially governed by NRS 
432B.550(5), once Nellie’s parental rights were terminated, a different placement preference 
provision under NRS 128.110(2) applied.  Nellie’s parental rights were terminated before the 
placement hearing that gave custody and control of the child to DFS. Thus, the district court erred 
in applying the familial placement preference under NRS 432B.550(5). 
 
Delay in requesting placement  
 
 The foster parents and DFS asserted that Stephanie’s 15-month delay in requesting 
placement, without a reasonable excuse, rendered the familial placement preference inapplicable. 
The Court disagreed. In Clark County District Attorney v. Eighth Judicial District Court, the Court 
held that “a family member’s failure to timely. . . request custody of a child. . . when that family 
member knows of the protective custody placement, may ultimately. . . render the statutory familial 
preference inapplicable. . .”4  
 Here, the record supports the district court’s decision that DFS should have located 
Stephanie earlier, and because she did not know the child was in protective custody, she had a 
reasonable excuse for the delay in seeking placement of the child. Therefore, the delay did not 
render the familial preference inapplicable.   
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2  The record indicated that Nellie was pregnant at the time of the evidentiary hearing. A child was born on April 24, 
2017 and placed in protective custody shortly thereafter. 
3  NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 432B.550(5)(a)–(b) (2017). 
4  Clark County District Attorney v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 123 Nev. 337, 347, 167 P.3d 922, 929 (2007). 
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The child’s best interest  
 
 DFS and the foster parents argued that the district court misapplied the legal standard by 
relying too heavily on the familial preference and not adequately considering the child’s best 
interest. The Court agreed. Following Clark County, the child’s best interest necessarily is the 
main consideration in the placement decision.5 The Clark County Court explained that “the statute 
creates a familial preference, not a presumption” and that the district court “must make written 
factual findings” supporting its ultimate conclusion regarding the child’s best interest.6  
 Here, the hearing master’s recommendation did not provide findings as to the child’s best 
interest as required by Clark County, except for acknowledging that the removal will cause the 
child trauma and ordering a trauma-minimization transition. While the district court concluded 
that the hearing master did consider the child’s best interest, the district court also did not include 
written findings regarding the child’s best interest.  
 
Discretion of the agency 
 
 Lastly, because the district court applied NRS 432B.550(5)(b), the district court did not 
consider the agency’s discretion to determine placement under NRS 128.110(2). NRS 
128.110(2)(a) states that the agency “[m]ay give preference to the placement of the child” to a 
suitable family member,7 while NRS 432B.550(5)(b) states that “preference must be given” to the 
placement of the child with a suitable family member.8 By applying the wrong statute, the district 
court erroneously failed to consider DFS’s discretion in the matter. Further, since the younger 
sibling’s placement was not clear at the time of the underlying proceeding, placing the siblings 
together required more factual development.    
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court concluded that the district court erroneously applied the familial placement 
preference under NRS 432B.550(5) because NRS 128.110(2) is the applicable standard once 
parental rights are terminated. The district court also failed to provide adequate factual findings 
concerning the child’s best interest. Accordingly, the Court granted the petitions and issued a writ 
of mandamus directing the district court to vacate the order placing the child with the maternal 
relatives and to conduct a trial de novo consistent with this opinion.     
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7  NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.110(2)(a) (2017). 
8  NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.550(5)(b) (2017) (emphasis added). 
